No.030, Jan./Feb., 2003

Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America
By Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangsui. Panama City, Panama: Pan American Publishing Company, 2002. 197 pp.

In Chinese

Two army colonels of the Chinese People's Liberation Army wrote a book in 1999 predicting that future wars against the United States or the West could be carried out in many forms, ranging from attacks by terrorists and computer hackers to financial collapse. Reportedly, they also predicted the attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001, which were masterminded by Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization. Their book was translated into English and distributed among the intelligence community in the US three years before the events of last September.

In his introduction to the book, author Al Santoli, berates Washington for ignoring the predictions of the two army colonels, and praises the colonels for giving the West an opportunity to prepare for the coming wars. Adversaries of the West will be using "asymmetrical" methods, which mean anything except conventional methods of warfare. In the 21st century, one should expect asymmetrical warfare in which adversaries use disinformation and computer hackers infiltrate secret government computer systems to gain or destroy vital information. Other methods of warfare may include psychological attacks, chemical and biological weapons, drugs etc.

Is there a connection between China and Osama bin Laden and his organization and the attacks on the US? No one can answer that question with certainty even though news stories claim that a connection exists. One fact seems certain, however: Al Qaeda leaders may have learned from the book "Unrestricted Warfare" to plan their attacks on the US. More than three years before the September 11 attacks, the two Chinese colonels predicted that an inferior adversary could defeat a more powerful country: in this case, the US.

"Whether it be intrusions of hackers, a major explosion at the World Trade Center, or a bombing attack by bin Laden, all of these greatly exceed the frequency bandwidths understood by the American military," the colonels say. "This is because they have never taken into consideration and have even refused to consider means that are contrary to tradition and to select measures of operation other than military means."

The two colonels devote a major study to the war waged by the US leadership against Iraq after the latter invaded Kuwait in August 1990. In this conflict state of the art warplanes and weaponry, information technology and psychological tactics were used to defeat the Iraqis with few casualties for the allied forces under US command.

As students of warfare, with knowledge ranging from ancient Chinese philosophy to Western concepts of war, the two colonels understand that a victory is possible if combined means are used to defeat the enemy.

"Regardless of whether the war was 3,000 years ago or at the end of the 20th century, it seems that all the victories display one common phenomenon: the winner is the one who combined well," they write.

In the new conflict in the 21st century, the authors believe that information technology, computer viruses, financial tools and non-military technology can be used in combination to defeat an enemy. The authors mention the business tactics of George Soros, a well-known currency trader, as one example of combined methods in a war. Soros has been accused of causing the 1997 financial collapse of some Asian countries by manipulating currency exchanges to make huge profits for himself.

Causing stock market collapse could be seen as part of a combination of tactics designed to win a war. The authors also cite the example of the decline in Taiwan's stock market in 1995-1996 when mainland China fires missiles into the Taiwan Strait to warn Taiwanese people preparing to hold a democratic presidential election. In the age of globalization, warfare has taken on a new shape that demands new methods to attain victory, in which army generals can become politicians and soldiers may not be needed in the conventional sense.


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