Andrew Scobell, an associate research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, argues in this book that China is not a war-mongering country despite various opinions that it is becoming so due to growing military and economic power. Scobell says Chinese leaders are influenced by (1) a Confucian philosophy that is against war and also by (2) a realistic view of the world, which requires military action if necessary. He calls that attitude a "Chinese Cult of Defense." The core of that Cult of Defense is that the Chinese people are peace-loving people, not aggressive or expansionist - and will only use force in self-defense. The defensive attitude resulted from centuries-old traditions that started with the construction of the Great Wall in China. But the willingness to use force comes from a tradition resulting from the Long March, which produced communist leaders, including Mao Zedong. This book studies China's involvement in the Korean War, the war against Vietnam, India, in South China Sea, and the missile threat in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96. Domestically, Chinese leaders have ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to restore order during the violent Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and to put down pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989. There are plenty of events to study China's use of force and the relationship between civilian and military leaders.

The most concrete example of how Beijing uses force is the events in 1989. Scobell says the PLA's military leaders were reluctant in the beginning to use force against the students. But as the crisis in Tiananmen Square continued for days and weeks, PLA soldiers became more aggressive in cracking down on the students. The PLA was reported in this case to have followed orders to end the massive student demonstration because all decisions were made by Deng Xiaoping. Scobell says these decisions were "deliberate and calculated." He says some PLA officers, particularly young reformed-minded officers, questioned Beijing's civilian leaders on the value of their decisions. The Tiananmen Square events took place at a time when communist governments in Eastern Europe were collapsing in 1989, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Chinese military officers behaved differently in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis. They became more hawkish in 1995 after then President Lee Teng-hui made a trip to Cornell University, which triggered the crisis.

But Scobell says the display of live-fire exercises and missile tests in the straits was what he called a "coercive diplomacy" which was the result of cooperation between civil and military leaders. Scobell says some PLA leaders believe that the Taiwan issues are not going to disappear, and they are eager to find a solution after the return of Hong Kong and Macao to the mainland. A small number of Long March leaders played a role in the decision to launch the missiles to threaten voters in Taiwan. He says mainland leaders, both civilian and military, become emotional and patriotic when they discuss the Taiwan issues. The military in particular considers itself responsible for the unification of mainland and Taiwan.

"For China's leaders, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis stands as a largely successful instance of coercive diplomacy," he says, explaining that it was successful because the display of military power did not result in a war and pro-independence Taiwanese became less vocal.

The crisis has demonstrated to Beijing's military leaders that they have an advantage in missile technology over Taiwan. Those missiles can be topped with warheads that could cause extensive damage to Taiwan's defense capabilities, Scobell says.

The author says there was a clear lack of communication between Beijing and Washington during the Taiwan Strait Crisis, which could have had dangerous consequences leading to conflict between China and the US. Washington was uncertain of Beijing's military intentions. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher at that time warned that any misstep by either side could lead to an unintended war. Beijing at the time stated its intention was only to intimidate Taipei, though a misstep was always a possibility.