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No.039,
July/August, 2004
Taiwan's Security and Air Power: Taiwan's Defense Against the Threat from Mainland China.
Edited by Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai. New York, N.Y.: Routledge Curzon, 2004. 190 pp.
In Chinese
Air power is considered Taiwan's most important defense against attacks from mainland China. Situated just 300 kilometers from the mainland, nearly every site in Taiwan is vulnerable to China's missiles. The only way it can strike back in case of an attack or an invasion is through a strong military air fleet. Thus, Taiwan is faced with a determined mainland that has launched ambitious modernization programs of its military while the island nation continues to be internationally isolated, unable to receive large-scale political and military assistance. Internally, Taiwan has to deal with elements resisting reform within its defense establishment, a bloated bureaucracy and an environment that restricts its economic development. Faced with challenges from within and without, the authors of this book argue that air power remains the only effective way to defend Taiwan. The People's Liberation Army Air Force has been training intensively to be able to carry out offensive air operations.
Authors Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su offer a study in offensive-defensive strategy, stating that if China develops the capability to carry out the first strike, Taiwan will have to develop preemptive counterattack measures capable of frustrating the first-strike option. As a matter of necessity, Taiwan will have to apply air power to anticipate any strike from China.
"Given Taiwan's current strategic environment, the neutralization of China's power is the key factor in the defense of Taiwan," they say. "Taiwan should build an offensive capability to strike China's air force capabilities."
They cite information indicating that China has deployed 1,200 fighter planes in the "first line" which the US estimates to include one-third of the country's all combat aircrafts. While the deployment seems formidable, the authors say Taiwan can concentrate its military resources on defeating a limited number of China's air targets, which would help Taiwan defeat the Chinese air force and frustrate an invasion plan.
"There is no question Taiwan faces a tremendous military threat and must use whatever capabilities it can to defeat an enemy invasion and safeguard its national security," they say. Strategically, if Taiwan can defeat the threat from the mainland, it will contribute to the region's security.
Robert Pape writes that a preemptive air strike from China against Taiwan is possible, but unlikely to happen, as it would cause a strong international reaction, including one from the US. Pape predicts that Chinese preemptive strike would fail for this reason.
The concept of preemptive strategies has been much talked about since the US launched preemptive strikes against Kosovo and Iraq. China's threats against Taiwan include an invasion with the goal of gaining control of the territory, a naval blockade to stop all traffic in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and a missile attack with the objectives of destroying major population, economic and military targets. The use of air power to carry out these threats would lead to attacking the leadership and major national centers of communication, thereby paralyzing the country, which Pape calls a decapitation.
But Pape argues that, based on historical facts, such an air campaign cannot force a country to surrender. Pape says threats from the mainland cannot be successful unless they are carried out massively. The author argues that Taiwan should not retaliate unilaterally in case of a preemptive strike from the mainland because a unilateral response would lose US support.
"If Taiwan acts without working with the US, then this, more than any Chinese military pressure, could lead to Taiwan's downfall," Pape says.
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