Back in the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy challenged Americans to beat the Soviet Union in the race to conquer space and land on the moon. In some advanced European countries, governments challenged their citizens to build strong industries to prove their superiority. But in China, the challenge was aimed at building a military force, based on the development of science and technology. Chinese technocrats and scientists wanted China to lead in the 21st century in the areas of science and technology. Leaders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) called for new and better weapons and developed management solutions to implement these ideas and meet the challenge.

The author of this book states that technological development has become directly linked to the concept of national power, and to China's transformation into a superpower. Mao Tsetung called for developing an atomic bomb when he felt threatened by the US. In a sense, Chinese leaders equated technology with national power and strived to overcome foreign dominance in these areas. Even during the later stages of 1980s and 1990s, when economic policies became priorities, Beijing military leaders maintained the position that they would conquer the world by advancing their technological capabilities.

The idea of gaining superiority in technology started in the early 1950s, after Communist forces took over the mainland, with the PLA playing an important role in national economic and political life. A group of PLA marshals, generals and military scientists formed the core thinkers who built the foundation for a strong China. It was mostly Marshall Nie Rongzhen, however, who reformulated a strategic and comprehensive package of defense technology for China at that time. Nie's defense package influenced China's economic development for decades, the author states.

When President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, Mao tilted his foreign policy in favor of the US. But when Mao died in 1976, the power struggle became fierce in the mainland, resulting in the emergence of Deng Xiaoping as the paramount leader. Deng subsequently purged Mao's policy for an intensive military industry, and replaced it with programs to promote civilian construction, light industry and consumer-oriented sectors. By the time he reached full power in 1978, Deng felt confident enough to emphasize economic development over the military and declared that China had earned 25 to 30 years of security, enough time to build its economy after decades of Mao's military construction. Deng undertook the task of de-militarizing China, but he continued the development of science and technology.

The author states that Deng had three goals: to shift investment strategy from capital intensive to light industries, to promote demilitarization of industry and finally, to broaden the role of technology in economic policy.

"All three of these shifts had a dramatic effect on how the pioneers of China's strategic technology projects worked, researched and politicked," the author wrote, adding that within a few years of Deng's rise to power, the policy of weapons development put forward by Marshall Nie and PLA generals were effectively eliminated. China's break with the past had become a challenge throughout the history of the Communist party and technological development was the touchstone for its rise to global power, the author said. Its military planners developed new and lethal weapons with the capacity to threaten Taiwan. But the author also mentions that weapons development and information technology have progressed so fast, that Chinese military planners have had difficulty keeping up with the pace of progress. China thus is still decades away from possessing the capability to challenge the US. The author said China's strategic forces are still "backward and vulnerable," though still capable of challenging the US and its allies with "asymmetric" weapons that aim at countering specific defense weaknesses in the US and its allies.