In 1997, Richard C. Bush was Chairman and Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, the semi-official US Embassy in Taipei. He took on these roles after decades of involvement in US foreign policy in Congress as well as taking part in the work of several think tanks. His numerous high-level positions have allowed him to speak with authority on a subject that still occupies a significant place in US-China relations.

Bush says he wrote the essays in this book when he was head of the Institute in Taipei in order to give answers to the many questions being asked about the fate of Taiwan. The dispute across the Taiwan Strait is still alive decades after the US first became heavily involved in Asia in 1942. During World War II, US President Franklin Roosevelt decided to return Taiwan, which was still occupied by Japan, to the mainland even as Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek fought with communists for control over the vast country. But the Nationalists were defeated and forced to retreat to Taiwan, which changed the course of Chinese history.

US-Taiwan relations since 1942 have gone through complex and difficult phases. In 1942 and 1943, when war was raging on several fronts in Europe, US policy makers did not spent much time discussing Taiwan. Many of them thought that Taiwanese are Chinese, and therefore the island should be returned to the mainland. Washington considered several options at the end of World War II, including making Taiwan an independent country in order to keep it away from China. The author says that five decades later, with the full democratization of Taiwan, the people of Taiwan can have a say over their destiny. As the US became more involved in Taiwanese affairs under the KMT government, it had to deal with the KMT repressive tactics, including the February 28 uprising and other cases like the 1979 Kaohsiung incident. Bush said the US faced "difficult dilemmas" when dealing with those incidents in which political opposition to the ruling KMT was ruthlessly repressed.

The KMT ruled the island for more than 50 years, during which its authoritative government maintained a moral stance in order to distance itself from the communist regime on the mainland. Bush says the KMT modified that attitude and adopted a more pragmatic position when the US switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1978 as a consequence of Taipei losing the UN seat to Beijing in 1971. Years before the UN voted to recognize Beijing, Bush says Washington considered creating dual representation in the UN for both Taipei and Beijing, but discussions failed to lead to a positive agreement. The author says that if the idea of dual representation had been accepted, it would have been a "lasting legacy for Taiwan" and would have lessened the dispute between the two sides today.

The dispute over the status of Taiwan continues to erupt once in a while, involving the US and China. It is interesting to study the various communiqués and documents published since 1971, using them to determine the US-China relationship. From the Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972 to the Taiwan Relations Act by the US Congress, the chapter devoted to the study and interpretation of those texts is worth reading; it shows why the complex situation still divides governments. Bush calls the communiqués and documents "Sacred Texts" of US-China-Taiwan relations. His profound understanding of those texts can help guide present-day policymakers to find solutions to the Taiwan cross-strait dispute.

President George W. Bush has become a strong supporter of Taiwan since entering the White House in 2001. Three things have happened since September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the US: the return of China to a policy of economic attraction with Taiwan rather than of military confrontation, the DPP becoming the ruling power in Taiwan, and the emergence of an identity issue on the island. Bush says that the challenge for the Taiwanese is to reconcile their desire for democracy with their quest for identity.