US-China relations have been described as a love-hate relationship for obvious reasons: American presidents have different views on China and have tried to form policies that conform to those views. There have been policy makers who look at China as a friend, and others who regard her as an enemy. Misperceptions and overly optimistic views of China both play a role in the formulation of Washington's China policy. In addition, there are interest groups, agencies and departments in Washington that compete to set their own agendas with regard to China. The US Congress, National Security Council, State Department, Treasury and Commerce Departments and the National Economic Council all have some influence in the decision-making mechanisms of the White House. It was President Nixon who in the 1960s began the process of rapprochement with China because he considered the giant communist country with the world's largest population to be a "friend." Mao Tsetung took over the mainland and ousted the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek in 1949.

Nixon set the rapprochement program in an article in Foreign Affairs in September 1967, more than a year before his election to the White House. He argued that China should be viewed as a great and progressing nation, says the author of this study, Jean A. Garrison. Nixon wanted to break away from the status quo that had existed since 1949, during which time the mainland was kept out of international organizations while the regime in Taipei under KMT leadership held China's UN seat. Nixon's reversal provoked a strong debate in Washington, led by conservatives who saw it as a betrayal of an old ally like Taiwan.

Since 1949, the US had recognized the KMT as the legitimate government of China, and had maintained strong economic and political ties with it. But liberals in Washington pushed for switching US recognition from Taiwan to the mainland. The US debate on China policy thus began with Nixon and continues today under President George W. Bush. Nixon visited China in February of 1972. One direct consequence of the new US-China relationship was the Shanghai Communique, which dealt with Taiwan-related issues, and whose language was kept ambiguous.

Nixon's China visit was an international event with significant political implications for the two countries. It propelled Nixon's presidency and popularity to a global level. Nixon said that the breakthrough visit the American people had been prepared for was a big "surprise in history." During negotiations prior to Nixon's arrival in Beijing, Henry Kissinger, who was the chief architect of the US rapprochement with China, discussed maintaining Taiwan in the UN seat in addition to a second UN seat for China. This did not work. Taiwan was ousted from the UN General Assembly in 1971 and has since remained outside despite its efforts to be reintegrated into the UN.

The process of normalizing US-China diplomatic relations encountered many obstacles, and was not completed until the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Deng Xiaoping understood from the beginning that the normalization could not proceed smoothly unless US ties with Taiwan were downgraded. President Ronald Reagan undertook a balancing act between China and Taiwan during his 8-year tenure, first by taking the Taiwan Relations Act as the basis for US-China policy and not the 1978 Shanghai Communiqu?. Reagan strengthened ties with Taiwan and made them more official than in past US presidencies.

Beijing accused Reagan of interfering into its internal affairs with Taiwan, and US-China ties deteriorated after the US decided to sell military spare parts to Taiwan in 1981. The first Bush administration was marked by the collapse of the Soviet empire and the Chinese crackdown of pro-demonstration students in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. The latter event had a strong negative impact on US perception of China, following years of euphoria after Nixon first reopened ties with the mainland. US-imposed sanctions on China followed the massacre of students in Tiananmen Square. The current White House occupant, George W. Bush, reversed Bill Clinton's designation of China as a strategic partner. Bush and his team of advisers consider China to be a competitor and rival, not a partner. The current US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, considers China neither a friend nor an enemy, but as "a great power in the traditional sense," says the author.

The evaluation of US-China diplomatic relations is far from finished. US policy toward China allows competition between the two powers on economic as well as security matters, says the author.