The teachings of military strategist Sun Tzu, who wrote "The Art of War" around 500 BC, still exert a strong influence on the thinking of contemporary Chinese political and military leaders. The classic Sun Tzu idea is that someone who is best prepared for war will either win without fighting or will fight and win. He urges leaders to think boldly but act with extreme caution. Confucius concurs and declares: "The cautious seldom err."

With such teachings, Chinese leaders have laid the strategy for military action through millennia of dynasties and regimes. The authors of this book study the history and culture of the Chinese military from Mao's day to the present. The imagined enemies here are the three parties involved in the Taiwan Strait dispute: China, the US and Taiwan. They warn that imagined enemies can become real unless the sides in the dispute take steps to avert confrontation. "In the final analysis, the best strategy for all would be to temper extremist pronouncements and actions and redirect national policies to avert the final confrontation."

The authors laboriously demonstrate the differences in history, culture and strategic thinking between China and the West. They say the origin of Chinese strategic thinking is built on the philosophy that the Chinese are inward-looking, imbued with moral superiority and a disdain for outsiders. From Mao Zedong to the current leadership of Hu Jintao, the traditional code of conduct has been that peace should take precedence over other matters (he wei gui), because peace and stability can bring prosperity, progress and heaven's blessing, the authors say. On the contrary, war could bring instability and foreign dominance. Western strategists, on the other side, believe in power politics and individual characters rather than negotiations, or threaten use of force to back up negotiations. Another fundamental difference is that Western strategists give precedence to foreign intervention over domestic stability. Chinese strategists from Sun Tzu's time to the present have paid more attention to challenges to domestic stability than to international crises.

But traditional Chinese strategic thinking changed in the 1990's when the US began backing Taiwan's independence movement. Beijing has deeply altered its position with regard to war and peace since pro-independence forces in Taiwan have become more concrete in their pursuit.

Chinese leaders are aware of the possibility of war with the US over Taiwan. "The dilemma is how to appear tough on Taiwan, but compromising toward Washington," the authors say. While Beijing is seeking to prevent war, its military is also preparing to fight the US, which is the world's most powerful military force. The authors say Beijing's goal is to fight a small war (meaning Taiwan) in order to avert a big war (the US).

Beijing's new strategy is based on Mao Zedong's "active defense," which basically proclaimed that if China is attacked, it will counterattack. This most elementary position has not changed in the past five decades. Over the years, the People's Liberation Army has prepared for the possibility of the small war by holding annual military exercises near and on the Dongshuan Island in Fujian Province. The authors provide ample details of those exercises, which are carried out in stages. Chinese legislators in the meantime discussed the draft of an "anti-secession law," finally adopted in 2005, which aims at halting Taiwan's pro-independence movement by force if necessary.

Beijing's modernized military is now unfortunately facing the issue of war with Taiwan, which the authors say is irrational, while the logic of peace is more believable. "In the final analysis, the Taiwan issue is a political one," they say. "Its solution depends on the wisdom of the leaders in Beijing, Taipei and Washington rather than the military might on the two sides of the strait and the United States."