Taiwan's worldwide diplomatic activities and its diplomatic ties with some two dozen countries are facts that support the island nation's status as a sovereign nation, says author in analyzing Taiwan's foreign policy. "It is the position of this writer that, while foreign policy may be undertaken by non-state actors in Taiwan and elsewhere, Taiwan is indeed a state," the author says, adding that Taiwan has met three core concepts pertaining to the notion of a state: sovereignty, the state and nation. Based on those facts, Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, who is a professor of political science at Missouri State University, gives an overview and analysis of important political developments backing the conclusion that the Taiwanese government and people are capable of conducting their own foreign policy regardless of pressure from other countries, particularly China.

His analysis takes readers back to what the author calls the "golden era" of Taiwan's foreign relations, which lasted from 1950 to 1971, from the time the Republic of China moved from the mainland to Taiwan to when it lost its seat in the UN General Assembly. During those two decades, the US-Taiwan alliance was strong, backed by the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution of 1955, which was a US Congressional measure that gave broad power to the US to defend Taiwan. During the golden era, Taiwan was able to maintain diplomatic relations with a vast number of countries. The era of diplomatic isolation (1971-1988) began right after Taiwan left the UN and lasted until democratic reform was launched under the government of President Chiang Ching-kuo.

The third phase in Taiwan's difficult political journey is what the author calls the "pragmatic diplomatic era," which began in 1988 and has lasted to the present day. In this third phase, the author says Taiwan has experienced a metamorphosis with the lifting of martial law, the legalization of political parties, the deregulation of the media, a reform of the institutions and educational system and the growth of Taiwanese consciousness and identity. The third phase has been considered a kind of renaissance for the island nation because the Taiwanese people now democratically elect their leaders, invest heavily in the mainland and have begun cementing ties with diplomatic allies to support Taiwan's international ambitions.

The author says the establishment in 1988 of diplomatic ties with Grenada, which also had diplomatic relations with China, was the first sign that Taiwan would be willing to abandon the "one China" policy and accept the principle of dual recognition. The author says Taiwan went as far as to accept that the Pacific nation of Vanuatu recognize both Taiwan and China and allow those two countries to carry out development projects in separate parts of the island. But Beijing quickly rejected the idea of dual recognition and has severed ties with any country that also recognizes Taiwan.

The foreign aid programs launched by President Chen Shui-bian have brought dividends as many countries realize that they need economic and development assistance more than global politics, the author says. But he says that some form of so-called "dollar diplomacy" still is being pursued by the current government in Taipei in order to retain diplomatic allies, an issue that continues to divide the Taiwanese. In addition to the two dozen countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the government in Taipei also maintains 92 representative offices in cities in 59 countries. Those offices are known under various names, including Taipei Representative Office, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office and Trade Office of the Republic of China. Those offices perform the functions of embassies and consulates general. The author says Taiwan's foreign policy structures and decision-making process have changed dramatically since the end of martial law. "The system is now much more transparent and open to public scrutiny," he says.

But in his analysis, the author says it appears that the democratization process has complicated the foreign policy-making process in Taiwan because of the demand for transparency and openness. Under an authoritarian system, the conduct of foreign policy did not have to meet popular demands for openness. Still, the author says that few Taiwanese would want to return to martial law.